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INTRODUCTION

Detra Welch was once a long-term drug addict.' To support her habit,
she became involved in petty criminal conduct and, in 1997, was sentenced
to three years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for retail theft and
drug related offenses. 2 In 1999, on the eve of her daughter's birth, Detra
was indicted in Cook County for additional drug offenses and transported3
from the jail to the hospital, where she gave birth to a daughter, Gwynne p.
Unfortunately, Detra's daughter was born with birth defects stemming from
her mother's drug addiction.4 Three days after Gwynne's birth, Detra was
transferred back to the Cook County jail and sentenced to four years in the
Illinois Department of Corrections for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. 5 Gwynne's father was not present at her birth because he was in
jail awaiting trial on felony theft charges. 6 He was later sentenced to
fifteen years in prison and remained detached from Gwynne's life.7 With
both parents incarcerated, Gwynne was sent to live with a foster family. 8
While in prison, Detra fulfilled requirements of her service plan including completion of parenting classes, substance abuse treatment and
psychological evaluations. 9 Throughout her incarceration, Detra demonstrated enthusiasm for her daughter by sending gifts, letters and a book
along with a tape of her reading.' 0 Detra was eager to spend as much time
as possible with Gwynne and was persistent in scheduling visits.'1 During
the time Detra spent with Gwynne she "acted appropriately" and showed
affection for her daughter. 12
In 2002, Detra was released from prison and voluntarily completed a
drug treatment program. 13 After completing the program, the rehab agency
hired Detra as a "detox specialist" to help others overcome drug addic-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

In re Gywnne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 511 (111. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 511.
8.
Id. at 513.
9.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d 329, 336 (111. App. Ct. 2004), aft'd, 830 N.E.2d
508 (Ill. 2005).

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 336.
Id.
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tion. 14 Since Gwynne's birth in 1999, Detra has not been charged with any
criminal conduct and has remained drug free. 15 Despite Detra's notable
transformation, one year after her release from prison, a trial court judge
held that Detra was an unfit parent based on four statutory grounds: "failure
to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, failure to make reasonable
efforts or reasonable progress, repeated incarceration, and depravity."' 16 In
a separate hearing, the court held it was in Gwynne's best interest to
terminate Detra's parental rights.' 7 The First District Appellate Court
reversed the trial court's holding on three of the four unfitness grounds, but
concluded that Detra was an unfit parent based on her past incarceration. 18
Detra represents one of the 82.5% of incarcerated women in Illinois
who are mothers. 19 Like Detra, despite efforts to reform their lifestyles,
many of these women will lose their parental rights solely because of
incarceration. 20 This comment will explore the Illinois Supreme Court
decision in In re Gwynne P. and argue that the court failed to establish a
clear connection between Detra Welch's repeated incarceration and her
ability to discharge parental responsibilities. Part I will discuss background
information on the rising incarceration rates of women and the socioeconomic impact of imprisonment on families. It will also detail the procedure
for terminating parental rights in Illinois and the constitutional issues that
arise due to the fundamental liberty interest in parenting. Part II will review
the First District Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court's holding
of In re Gwynne P. The discussion will reveal that parental responsibilities
include more than financial support and physical presence because these
factors are nearly impossible for any incarcerated parent to fulfill. Part III
will shift focus to the policy implications of the court's decision. Given the
increasing rates of mothers in prison for drug related offenses, this section
will argue that terminating Detra Welch's parental rights undermines the
state's interest in rehabilitation. Section A will establish that Illinois has an
interest in rehabilitating drug offenders according to the Illinois constitution
and state statutes. Section B will discuss why the court should have given
Detra's rehabilitation more weight, because, by the time of the hearing,
Detra was capable of parenting Gwynne.
14.
Id.
15.
Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 5, as Amici
curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (I11.
2005) (No. 98131).
16.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 334; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(b),
(m),(s), (i) (2004).
17.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 334.
18.
Id.at 345.
19.

CHICAGO LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR INCARCERATED MOTHERS, WOMEN IN PRISON

FACT SHEET (2003), http://www.claim-il.org/about.html (last visited March 8, 2007).

20.
See Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 18, as
Amici curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THE
PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
THE RISING RATES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN AND THE IMPACT ON
FAMILIES

Historically, women have been underrepresented in the prison system
primarily because women are less likely to be convicted of serious crimes
resulting in lengthy prison sentences. 2 1 However, during the 1980s, the
incarceration rates for women began to rise largely due to the inception of
the "war on drugs. 22 During this time, drug offenses accounted for 49% of
the total increase in women's state prison populations, compared to 32% of
the increase for men.2 3 Between 1986 and 1996, the number of women
incarcerated in state prisons for drug offenses increased 888%.24 Overall,
by 1998, approximately 951,900 women were involved with the corrections
system. 25 This statistic translates into 1 in every 109 adult women in the
United States.26 In Illinois, the incarceration rate of women has increased
by more than twice the rate of men since 1993.27 In 2002, the number of
women in Illinois state prisons was 2,520.28 This number represents an
increase of 173% of women in Illinois prisons in the past ten years.29
The profiles of incarcerated women share some unfortunate characteristics. An estimated one-half of offenders in state prisons were using drugs,
alcohol, or both at the time of their offense. 30 Six out of ten women
reported using drugs in the month leading up to their arrest, and five out of
ten described themselves as daily drug users. 31 Furthermore, one-third of
women in state prisons committed the offense for which they were
incarcerated to obtain money for their drug habit. 32 In Illinois, 80% of
21.

MARC MAUER ET. AL.,

THE SENTENCING PROJECT, GENDER AND JUSTICE:

WOMEN, DRUGS, AND SENTENCING POLICY 4 (1999)

http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9042.pdf. In 1997, women accounted for 25% of
arrests for "serious" crime and 16% of violent crimes. Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.at 2.
25.
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN
OFFENDERS 6 (1999), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf.
26.
Id.
27.
CHICAGO LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR INCARCERATED MOTHERS, supra note 19.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 25, at 6.
31.
Id.at9.
32.
Id.
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women in prison need drug treatment,
which is only available to approxi33
mately 20% of the female inmates.
Another similarity among incarcerated women is that 70% of women
under the federal and state corrections systems have minor children.34 Each
woman has approximately 2.11 children, which translates into over 1.3
million children with incarcerated mothers.35 Although separating a father
from his children has negative consequences for the family, the impact
when a father is incarcerated is different for several reasons.36 When the
father is sentenced to prison, the mother usually continues to care for the
child.3 7 Because the mother is typically the primary caregiver, the child's
living situation is not significantly disturbed.38 However, many women
who are incarcerated are single parents and must rely on relatives to care
for their children. 39 Without support from family members, the children of
incarcerated mothers often end up in foster care.40 A study by Robert J.
LaLonde and Susan Marie George from the University of Chicago
projected that, over the next generation, approximately 60,000 children in
Illinois will have had a mother in the prison system. 41 Due to separation
from their mothers, these children face economic disadvantages and are at
risk for numerous psychological and developmental problems.4 2
B.

THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL LAW ON THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS

Furthermore, the rapidly increasing rate of incarcerated mothers destroys families through the termination of parental rights.43 While state law
primarily governs the termination of parental rights, federal legislation has
significantly impacted the reunification of children and their incarcerated

33.
CHICAGO LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR INCARCERATED MOTHERS, supra note 19.
34.
GREENFELD & SNELL, supra note 25, at 8.
35.
Id. at 7-8.
36.
Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, "It's a Family Affair"- The Incarcerationof
the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 279
(1994).
37. Id.at 279-80.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40. Id.
41.
ROBERT J. LALONDE & SUSAN MARIE GEORGE, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
INCARCERATED MOTHERS, THE CHICAGO PROJECT ON FEMALE PRISONERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN, INITIAL REPORT-JUNE 2002 16 (2002),
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Research/faculty-projects/incarcerated-mothers/lalonde in
carceratedmothers.pdf.
42. Id.at 16-17.
43.
See Brooks & Bahna, supra note 36, at 285-86.
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parents. 44 In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA) to address the growing population of children in the foster care
system.45 The primary goal of the ASFA is to expedite adoption and
parental rights proceedings to accelerate the placement of foster children
into permanent homes.4 6 While Congress did not have incarcerated parents
in mind when passing the ASFA, many argue that the legislation has had
dire consequences on incarcerated mothers and their parental rights.4 7 This
is largely because the Act mandates strict time limitation and accelerates
the process of termination proceedings.
The main provisions of the ASFA specifies when states must initiate
termination of parental rights proceedings and when state agencies are
required to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family. 48 The ASFA
requires a state to file a petition for the termination of parental rights after a
child has spent fifteen out of the past twenty-two months in foster care.49
The legislation provides three exceptions: (1) if the child is being cared for
by a relative; (2) if the state agency has documented a compelling reason
why filing a termination petition is not in the best interest of the child; and
(3) if the state has not provided the family of the child with the necessary
services to safely return the child to the child's home. 50 The statute also
requires states to make "reasonable efforts" to preserve and reunify
families, with a focus on the child's health and safety as a primary
concern. 51 However, states are not required to make reasonable efforts if a
parent has committed a violent crime against her child, subjected her child
to "aggravating circumstances" such as abandonment or chronic abuse, or
the parental rights of a sibling have been terminated.52

44.
Sally Day, Mothers in Prison:How the Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997
Threatens ParentalRights, 20 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 223 (2005).
45.
Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
46.
Katherine A. Hort, Note, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the
Child? ASFA 's Guidelinesfor the Termination of ParentalRights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1879, 1894-95 (2001).
47.
See, e.g., Day, supra note 44, at 223. The full consequences of the ASFA on
incarcerated parents is beyond the scope of this comment. However, this discussion is
important to understanding the role of the federal government in shaping the policies that
effect incarcerated parents.
48.
Id. at 221-222.
49.
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)(ii)(iii) (2000).
51.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2000).
52.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i),(ii),(iii) (2000).
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ILLINOIS'S RESPONSE

In order to receive federal finding for child welfare, states must comply with the ASFA. 53 In response to the ASFA, Illinois passed Senate Bill
1339 in June 1998.54 Most provisions of the ASFA are reflected in section
2/13 of the Illinois act. 55 However, Illinois went beyond the ASFA's
general requirements by including the fifteen out of twenty-two month
exception as a new basis for parental unfitness.56 This provision allows a
court to find a parent unfit solely because the child has been in foster care
fifteen out of the prior twenty-two months. The parent may rebut this
presumption by showing that it is in the child's best interest to be returned
to the parent within six months from the date of the proceeding. 57 In
addition, the timeline can be tolled if the court finds that the state did not
make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. 58 According to one author,
"[e]ven with these exceptions, this new provision does not require the state
to consider whether the parent is capable of, or interested in, parenting.
Thus, because Illinois's ASFA provisions go beyond what is required by
ASFA, it is likely that Illinois will find more parents unfit than will other
states. 59
In In re Gwynne P., the court recognized that the involuntary termination of parental rights is a "drastic measure. 6 ° Consequently, the Illinois
procedure for termination cases dictates that a court must first find, by clear
and convincing evidence, a parent is "unfit" before deciding whether the
termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. 61 The following
section discusses why such procedural safeguards are necessary to protect a
parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child.
D.

PROTECTING PARENTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THROUGH PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court held that parental rights are among the "oldest of the fundamental liberty interests. 62
The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental liberty interest of
53.
Hort, supra note 46, at 1881.
54.
Cheryl A. DeMichele, The Illinois Adoption Act: Should a Child's Length of
Time in FosterCare Measure Parental Unfitness?, 30 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 727,755 (1999).
55.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-13 (2004).
56.
Hort, supra note 46, at 1882; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(m-1) (2004).
57.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(m-1) (2004).
58.
Id.
59.
Hort, supra note 46, at 1903.
60. In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 516 (Ill.
2005).
61.
Id.
62.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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parents to make decisions about the care and custody of their children on
several occasions.6 3 In 1944, the Court noted "[iut is cardinal with us that
the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder." 64 However, parental rights are not absolute
and the state maintains authority to encroach upon parental rights when the
welfare of a child is in danger.65
Because parents have a fundamental right to raise their children, a
court may not permanently terminate a parent's rights without finding that a
parent is "unfit., 66 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to
prove unfitness based on clear and convincing evidence before a court can
terminate parental rights.67 The Court mandated this heightened burden of
proof because trial judges have wide discretion in evaluating a parent's
fitness and the proceedings may involve "imprecise substantive standards., 68 Furthermore, "[b]ecause parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups, such
proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on culture or bias. 69
The Court's apprehension about imprecise fact-finding and potentially
discriminatory holdings is relevant to proceedings involving incarcerated
parents. 70 The concern lies in the possibility for a court to "write the
prisoner off as a 'bad parent' " because of the individual's criminal
conduct.7 1 Yet, due to the fundamental liberty interest in parenting,
procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure courts do not presume
incarcerated parents are unfit. 72 Therefore, according to the Court in
Stanley v. Illinois, a parent has the right to an adversarial proceeding that
examines
the parent's individual circumstances before terminating parental
73
rights.

63.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (holding that the liberty
guarantee in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to raise
children).
64.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
65.
John C. Duncan, The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enuresfrom Parental
Reinforcement: The Journey to FamilyIntegrity, 83 NEB. L. REv. 1240, 1257 (2005).
66.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
67.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
Id.
68.
69.
Id. at 763 (citation omitted).
70.
Philip M. Genty, ProceduralDue Process Rights of IncarceratedParents in
Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings:A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757, 770
(1991-92).
71.
Id.
72.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
73.
Id. at 658-59.
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TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS IN ILLINOIS

In Illinois, the Juvenile Court Act 74 and the Adoption Act 75 govern the
termination of parental rights. Parental rights termination proceedings are
initiated by a petition under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act.76
Then the involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step
process. First, the trial court must find, based on clear and convincing
evidence, that the parent is unfit pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption
Act.
There are several factors listed in section I(D) of the Adoption Act
to determine unfitness; however, the state only needs to prove one ground
to establish that the parent is unfit.78 Second, if the court concludes the
parent is unfit, the court must decide, based on a preponderance of the
evidence, whether the termination of parental rights is in the child's best
interest under section 4.05 of the Juvenile Court Act. 7
Illinois has two provisions specifically defining unfitness for incarcerated parents. Section l(D)(r) of the Adoption Act states that a parent is
unfit if incarceration will prevent the parent from discharging parental
74.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1 (2004).
75.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (2004).
76.
In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Ill. 2001). According to section 2-29 of the
Adoption Act, a minor who is the subject of an "abuse, neglect, or dependency petition" can
be the subject of a petition for adoption. The parents of the child can surrender the child for
adoption to an agency authorized to place children up for adoption, consent to adoption, or
consent to adoption by a specific person. If the petition alleges that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights, the court must either obtain consent from the parent,
or make a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit. Then, the
court may terminate parental rights and appoint a guardian to appear in court during
proceedings for the adoption and consent to the adoption. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-29(2)
(2004).
77. In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d at 1119.
78.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (D) (2004) (indicating that the "grounds for unfitness
are any one or more of the following enumerated grounds"). Examples of grounds for
unfitness include: (a) abandonment, (c) desertion of the child for more than 3 months, (d)
substantial neglect of the child, (e) extreme cruelty, (f) two or more findings of physical
abuse, (j) open adultery or fornication, and (k) habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs.
Id.
79.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d 329, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). See also 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(4.05) (2004).
The statute defines several factors courts must consider when determining
whether termination of parental right is in the child's best interests including: (a) the
physical safety and welfare of the child; (b) the development of the child's identity; (c) the
child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child's sense of
attachments; (e) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child's community ties; (g)
the child's need for permanence which includes the child's need for stability and continuity
of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives; (h) the uniqueness
of every family and child; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the
child. Id.
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obligations for a period of over two years. 80 Section 1(D)(s) of the
Adoption Act, which is the focus of this comment, states that a parent is
unfit if repeated incarceration has prevented the parent from discharging
parental responsibilities.8 1
An appellate court will give the trial court's findings great deference
because the trial court was in the best position to assess the overall
capabilities of the parties. 82 Therefore, the standard of review is whether
the trial court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.8 3
In evaluating whether the trial court's determination should be overturned,
an appellate court must consider each case of parental unfitness sui generis,
or "unique unto itself.", 84 If a court concludes that the parent is unfit and
that it is in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights, the parent is
to that child. 85 Consequently, the parent-child
"deprived of all legal rights"
86
relationship is destroyed.
The drastic impact of termination proceedings reiterates the need for
strict adherence to procedural and constitutional standards.87 As the courts'
decisions in In re Gwynne P. demonstrate, termination proceedings involve
weighing the particular circumstances of each case to ensure parental rights
are not easily disturbed. The next section will discuss why the courts held
Detra Welch was an unfit mother based solely on her repeated incarceration.
II.

DEFINING PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INCARCERATED PARENTS

A.

THE FIRST DISTRICT APPELLATE COURT'S DECISION: INRE GWYNNEP.

Shortly after baby Gwynne was born, the court adjudicated her a ward
of the state based on abuse, neglect, and dependency because she was born
with traces of cocaine and heroin in her system. 88 A year and a half after
80.
81.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(r) (2004).

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/l(D)(s) (2004).

In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 335.
Id.
1990).
In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 185 (I11.
85.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/17 (2004).
86.
InreSyck, 562 N.E.2d at 183.
87.
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 (1982). "[A] finding of permanent
neglect can cut off forever [the parent's] rights in their child. Given this disparity of
consequence, we have no difficulty finding that the balance of private interests strongly
favors heightened procedural protections." Id.
88.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 334. Gwynne P. was born on June 18, 1999.
On December 7, 1999, the court held Gwynne was a ward of the court and placed with the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Id. Gwynne was placed with a foster
82.
83.
84.
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Gwynne's birth, the state filed a petition to terminate both parents' rights
and asked that the court appoint a guardian for Gwynne who could consent
to an adoption proceeding.8 9
The state alleged that Detra Welch and
Gwynne's father were unfit parents based on four grounds in the Illinois
Adoption Act. 90 After conducting a fitness hearing, the trial court found
both parents unfit based on all statutory grounds alleged by the state. 91
During the second step of the termination proceeding, the court held it was
in Gwynne's best interest to terminate parental rights. 92 The court
appointed the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as
Gwynne's guardian administrator and granted the agency the right to
consent to her adoption. 93 The court placed Gwynne with a foster
94 family
and she remained in foster care throughout the court proceedings.
The First District Appellate Court reversed the trial court's findings of
unfitness for Detra on all grounds except for the repeated incarceration
provision. 95 The court's analysis reveals the tension of balancing Detra's
past criminal conduct with her rehabilitation and efforts to preserve a
relationship with Gwynne. First, the appellate court examined the trial
court's decision that Detra failed to maintain reasonable interest in
Gwynne's welfare. 96 The appellate court held that Detra was not an unfit
parent based on this ground because she had voluntarily enrolled in a drug
treatment program, remained drug free, and requested visits with Gwynne
on a regular basis. 97 The state argued that Detra had not demonstrated a
family in February 2000. Id. at 342. The state petitioned to terminate Detra Welch's
parental rights in January 2001. Id. at 334.
89.
Id.
90.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 334.
91.
Id. Although the court made findings for each parent, this comment focuses on
the court's analysis concerning Detra Welch. The appellate court reversed the trial court's
findings for Gwynne's father, Edward D., on all grounds except the repeated incarceration
provision. Edward D. chose not to appeal his case to the Illinois Supreme Court. In re
Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 516. (111. 2005).
92.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 334-35.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 342.
95.
Id. at 345. In an opinion by Justice Warren Wolfson, the First District held
Detra Welch was a fit parent under sections 50/l(D)(b), 50/1(D)(m), and 50/1(D)(i) of the
Adoption Act. Id. at 335-4 1. Justice Rodolfo Garcia was the sole dissenting justice. Id. at
345-49 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
96.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(b) (2004).
97.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 337. The service plan required Detra to request
visits with her daughter through the mail or by telephone and DCFS planned to schedule
quarterly one-hour visits. Id. at 336. There was some confusion at the hearing as to the
number of visits Detra requested and the number she was actually granted. Detra presented
evidence of ten letters and three telephones calls where she requested visitation and she was
entitled to eleven visits during her incarceration. However, a supervisor at DCFS could not
explain why Detra only received five visits despite her frequent requests. Id.
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suitable degree of interest in Gwynne because she had escaped from prison
by breaking her electronic monitoring device and was then returned to the
segregation unit at the prison. 98 Additionally, the state was concerned with
Detra's sporadic visitation and believed the cards and gifts she sent to
Gwynne were insufficient. 99 However, the court found that these factors
did not meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence to prove
parental unfitness. loo
The court noted that while incarceration did not absolve Detra from
her duty to maintain an interest in her daughter, it did limit her abilities to
demonstrate commitment to Gwynne.' 0 Therefore, it was necessary to
consider her overall circumstances when evaluating whether her actions
were reasonable. 10 2 For example, Detra's efforts to schedule visitation
were more important than the actual number of visits scheduled because her
initiative to arrange visitation demonstrated a reasonable degree of
interest. 0 3 Based on Detra's parenting classes, drug treatment, and ability
to remain drug free for nine months preceding the hearing, the First District
concluded that Detra maintained an interest in Gwynne and was not unfit
based on section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act. 104
The second ground the court considered was whether Detra failed to
make reasonable progress toward the return of her child under section
1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act. 05 The court held that Detra made
reasonable progress on her service plan by completing a psychiatric
evaluation, participating in substance abuse classes, and exhibiting
persistent efforts to maintain a visitation schedule with Gwynne.1 6 Thus,
Detra made reasonable progress toward reunification, and the appellate
court held that the trial court's 07decision on this factor was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
98.
Id. at 336-37. Although Detra's behavior was occasionally less than ideal, the
court noted that Detra was not pregnant at the time she escaped. Id.
99.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
100.
In re Gwynne P. 805 N.E.2d at 337.
101.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
Id. at 338. Section 1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act allows grounds for unfitness
105.
if the parent has failed to make "reasonable progress toward the return of the child ... within
9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
50/1(D)(m) (2004). In evaluating this standard, at a minimum, the parent must demonstrate
he or she has made progress to comply with the court's directions or service plan. In re
Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 336.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 339. Detra's service plan included "parenting
106.
classes, substance abuse assessment and treatment, psychological evaluation, and
counseling." Id. at 336.
107.
Id. at 339.
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In addition to Detra's progress, section 1(D)(m)(ii) allows a finding of
unfitness if the parent "failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from parent. 108
The original basis for removing Gwynne was neglect and abuse because
Gwynne was born exposed to controlled substances attributable to her
mother's drug addiction. 109 Again, the court considered Detra's limitations
while incarcerated to correct her drug problem." 0 The court focused on the
fact that after the neglect adjudication, Detra registered for treatment
services in the prison and participated in the program when the services
were made available."' The court found these efforts demonstrated Detra's
dedication to overcome her drug addiction, and therefore, reversed the trial
court's holding of unfitness on section l (D)(m) of the Adoption Act. "'
Finally, the appellate court overruled the trial court's finding that Detra was unfit due to depravity under section 50/1(D)(i)." 3 This factor
contains a rebuttable presumption of depravity if a person has been
convicted of three felonies, one conviction having been within five years of
the parental termination hearing.' 14 The court held that Detra presented
sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption because she successfully
completed a drug treatment program, obtained employment at the rehabilitation center, and completed parenting skills classes. 1 5 The court
determined Detra did not have an "inherent moral deficiency" and reversed
the trial court's holding on this ground. 116
Therefore, the only factor the First District affirmed was the trial
117
court's holding of unfitness based on Detra's repeated incarceration.
Section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act states that a parent may be found unfit
if
[t]he child is in the temporary custody or guardianship of
the Department of Children and Family Services, the parent
is incarcerated at the time the petition or motion for termination of parental rights is filed, the parent has been repeatedly incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions, and
108.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5011 (D)(m)(ii) (2004).

109.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 340.
110.
Id.
111.
Id. Treatment services were not available to Detra while she was segregated
from the general prison population. Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.at 341.
114.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 341. Detra had been convicted on two felony
narcotics charges and one felony theft charge. Id.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 340-41.
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the parent's repeated incarceration has prevented the parent
from discharging his or her parental responsibilities for the
child. 118
Unlike the detailed analysis given on the previous factors, the First District
provided little support for its decision to affirm the trial court's finding of
unfitness based on repeated incarceration. In fact, the court did not evaluate
the mother and father separately as it did for the other factors. 119 Instead, it
made a general conclusion applicable to both parties. 120 The court based its
decision to terminate parental rights on the fact that neither parent could
provide a "stable home, financial or emotional support" for Gwynne while
they were incarcerated. 121 Consequently, the court held that Detra was an
unfit parent because repeated22incarceration prevented her from discharging
her parental responsibilities.
The court went on to conclude that terminating Detra's parental rights
was in Gwynne's best interests. 23 The court looked to the fact that
Gwynne had lived with a foster family nearly her entire life. 124 Gwynne
with this family and referred to her foster parents as
had formed a bond' 25
"mom" and "papa."'
Furthermore, the foster parents were able to care for
Gwynne's special needs and planned to adopt her. 126 Therefore, the
Detra's parental rights was in the
appellate court affirmed that
27 terminating
1
Gwynne.
of
interests
best
The appellate court's analysis reveals the difficult nature of this case
because on many levels the court found Detra was a fit parent. The court's
detailed account of Detra's constant concern for her daughter and dedication to overcoming a drug addiction demonstrates the tension of balancing
her past criminal conduct with her reformed lifestyle. Yet, on appeal, the
118.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1(D)(s) (2004).
119.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 340-42.
Id.at 340. "We find the trial court's determination that both respondents were
120.
unfit based on the statutory ground of repeated incarceration was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence." Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
121.
Id. at 341.
Id.
122.
Id. at 343.
123.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 340-42.
124.
Id.at 342.
125.
Id.at 343. At the hearing, a social worker testified that Gwynne's foster parents
126.
were capable of meeting Gwynne's special needs because "they completed extensive
training and the foster mother had a master's degree in early childhood special education."
Id. at 343.
127.
Id. Ultimately the decision to terminate a parent's rights rests on a determination of what is in the best interests of the child because this is the second step in a
termination proceeding. See id. at 342. However, the focus of this comment is on the first
stage of the proceeding, which determines whether the parent is unfit.
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Illinois Supreme Court unanimously found Detra's repeated incarceration
was sufficient to permanently deprive her of her parental rights to
Gwynne. 128
B.

THE INTANGIBLE ASPECTS OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the First District's holding that
Detra Welch was an unfit parent based solely on her past incarceration. 129
The crux of the supreme court's decision turned on whether "Detra's
repeated incarceration has prevented her from discharging her parental
responsibilities for Gwynne."' 130 However, the court failed to articulate a
precise meaning of "parental responsibilities," or how any incarcerated
parent can meet parenting obligations while physically separated from his
or her child.
The court's analysis of Detra's parental responsibilities focused on her
lack of physical presence and financial support. 13 1 The court noted that
Detra was in prison during the early years of Gwynne's life and, therefore,
was unable to provide care for her daughter. 32 Detra's lack of parenting
skills was particularly relevant because of Gwynne's birth defects and
special needs.1 33 Yet, the court overlooked evidence that Detra completed
parenting classes while in prison, behaved appropriately during visits with
Gwynne, 134 and had cared for her brother's three children three times per
week since her release. 135 Furthermore,
since her release Detra maintained
36
monthly visits with Gwynne. 1
Another parental responsibility the court discussed was Detra's inability to financially support her daughter. 137 Although Detra obtained a job
after her release from prison, the court found there was insufficient
evidence to indicate her job was enough to support herself, let alone her
daughter. 138 Aside from Detra's physical separation from Gwynne and
128.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 521-22 (I11.
2005).
129.
Id. at 521.
130.
id. at 517. See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(s) (2004).
131.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 520-21.
132.
Id. at 521.
133.
Id. Gwynne needed "occupational, physical, and speech therapy" because of
birth defects caused by her mother's addiction to heroin and cocaine. In re Gwynne P., 805
N.E.2d 329, 342 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004).
134.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 336.
135.
Id. at 346 (Garcia, J., dissenting). Detra's care for her brother's children
demonstrates her parenting skills because she cooked for the children, bathed them, dressed
them and was "basically being a mother to them." Id.
136.
Id. at 336 (majority opinion).
137.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 521.
138.
Id.
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financial limitations, the court did not specify any further characteristics
defining parental responsibilities.
Although physical care and financial support are significant parental
responsibilities, Professor Philip M. Genty suggests, "family relationships
and parental rights and responsibilities extend beyond these material
Child-parent relationships involve "intangible"
considerations."1 39
characteristics that include "love and affection, religious or moral guidance,
emotional support and a sense of 'roots' and family identity."' 4 ° Unlike
physical care or economic stability, emotional or intangible parental duties
can be preserved while a parent is incarcerated. 41 Although intangible
aspects of Detra's efforts to preserve a relationship with her child are not
determinative, these qualities deserve consideration.
The appellate court stressed it was necessary to consider the limitations of Detra's incarceration while assessing her parental fitness on several
grounds. 142 Yet, when deciding whether incarceration prevented Detra
from discharging her parental responsibilities, the court disregarded
restrictions imposed on her while incarcerated.143 Amici curiae on behalf
of Detra Welch argued that the court should clearly define the meaning of
"parental responsibilities" under section 1(D)(s) to keep incarceration from
becoming a per se rule for unfitness.44 The supreme court's response to
amici's position was incomplete. The court stated that the plain language
of the statute does not make repeated incarceration alone grounds for
unfitness because the statute requires an "additional showing that the
repeated incarceration has prevented the parent from discharging his or her
139.
Genty, supra note 70, at 767.
Id. Others have also noted the significance of the emotional connection
140.
between a parent and child. For example, in assessing the definition of a parent, John C.
Duncan stated, "[t]he word 'parent' carries the connotation that there is a relationship of
mutual love and affection between the parents and the child and that the parents are the
individuals who are responsible for child support, maintenance, instruction, discipline, and
guidance of the child." Duncan, supra note 65, at 1247.
141.
Genty, supra note 70, at 769.
142.
See In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 337. Under section 50/1(D)(b) of the
Adoption Act, failure to maintain a reasonable degree of concern, interest, or responsibility,
the court stated "[w]e must also consider the limitations of Detra W.'s incarceration when
considering whether her efforts with Gwynne P. showed reasonable interest or concern." Id.
Also, for section 1(D)(m), failure to make reasonable progress or efforts, the court held
"Detra W. had little opportunity to make reasonable efforts toward correcting the conditions
that led to Gwynne P.'s removal due to the limiting circumstances of her incarceration." Id.
at 340.
143.
Instead, the court relied on the fact that Detra was separated from Gwynne
during the early years of her life and had a diminished economic status. In re Gwynne P.,
830 N.E.2d at 520-2 1.
144.
Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 9, as Amici
curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
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parental responsibilities."' 145
However, given the inherent limitations
incarceration imposes on a parent's ability to provide for a child, the court
failed to define the meaning of "parental responsibilities" for incarcerated
parents.
Without establishing a clear connection between incarceration and
parental responsibilities, parents like Detra Welch, are almost automatically
found unfit because physical and/or financial support are nearly impossible
to fulfill while incarcerated. Due process requires courts to consider all
attributes of the parent-child relationship and not only construe the quantity
but the quality of the parent's efforts to maintain a meaningful relationship. 146 By focusing on Detra's lack of physical presence or financial
support the court ignored Detra Welch's efforts to preserve a relationship
with Gwynne. As the dissenting justice stated in the First District's
opinion, "Detra W. did provide emotional support to her child ...in the
form of letter writing, small gifts, the sharing of photos, the cassette of her
reading a book for Gwynne, and the kind and gentle words she must have
expressed to Gwynne during their brief visits.' ' 147 These efforts demonstrate Detra's ability to fulfill the crucial emotional aspects of parental
responsibilities. Incarceration may have prevented Detra from providing a
home or financial support, but she fulfilled the parental responsibilities that
she was able to provide while in prison. 148
Although intangible qualities of parenting may be difficult to measure,
previous case law indicates that Illinois courts have considered these
aspects. When defining parental obligations for incarcerated parents, courts
have followed the standard set out in the Illinois Supreme Court decision In
re D.D. 149 The In re D.D. decision held that courts should consider the
"overall impact" incarceration has had on a parent in terms of whether
incarceration has caused a "diminished capacity to provide financial,
physical, and emotional support."' 150 This standard signifies that "emotional support" is a factor courts should consider. However, like In re
Gwynne P., physical and financial support often becomes decisive, perhaps
because such qualities are easier to measure.
In In re D.D., the court explained the meaning of emotional support by
stating that "the cumulative effect of M.D.'s repeated incarceration has
145.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 517.
146.
Genty, supra note 70, at 762.
147.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 348 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
148.
See id. (suggesting that it is a "legal fiction" to assess Detra's inability to
provide a home or economic support while she was in custody of the corrections system).
149.
In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d at 1121.
150.
Id. The In re D.D. decision was the first time the Illinois Supreme Court
construed section l(D)(s) of the Adoption Act because it was recently added to the Act in
1998. Id.
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rendered him incapable of meeting D.D.'s moral, mental, and emotional
needs." 1 51 Although moral guidance or mental support cannot be easily
quantified, courts can weigh these considerations by examining the
circumstances of each case. For example, the appellate court in In re
Gwynne P. noted several findings related to Detra's efforts to maintain
emotional ties with her daughter while evaluating section l(D)(b) of the
Adoption Act. 152 The court discussed her parenting classes, the gifts she
sent, and a social worker's testimony that Detra acted affectionately during
visits with Gwynne. 153 These findings demonstrate that courts can take
intangible qualities into account by inquiring about the parents' efforts to
maintain a relationship with their child.
Additionally, the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, In re H.G.,
suggests that courts are beginning to examine the intangible aspects of
parental responsibilities more closely. 154 In In re H.G., the court held that
presuming a parent is unfit if the child has been in foster care for fifteen
months out of a twenty-two-month period violates substantive due
process. 155 This provision of the Adoption Act was unconstitutional
because the presumption was based on the passage of time and lacked
inquiry into the "parent's ability to provide the child with good care and
treatment."1 56 According to In re H.G., parental responsibilities, at least
implicitly, entail findings beyond physical qualities because unfitness
cannot be based on a period of time when the child was physically
separated from his or her parent.
Although emotional or intangible aspects are difficult to measure,
these qualities are part of parental responsibilities. 157 Despite her physical
separation and financial limitations, Detra did all she could to provide for
her daughter. While not determinative, the court should have evaluated
intangible factors in determining whether Detra was able to meet parental
responsibilities while incarcerated.

151.
Id.atll2l.
152.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 336.
153.
Id. The court's discussion of these factors was included in the analysis of
whether Detra was unfit based on section 1(D)(b), failure to maintain a reasonable degree of
concern, interest or responsibility. Id. at 335-36.
154.
In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ill. 2001). The H.G. decision was based on
section l(D)(m-1) of the Adoption Act. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(D)(m-1) (2004).
155.
InreH.G., 757 N.E.2d at 874.
156.
Id. at 871.
157.
Genty, supra note 70, at 767.
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THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVELOPING EMOTIONAL TIES WITH AN
INCARCERATED PARENT

In contrast, the state argued that because Detra was incarcerated during
the first three years of her daughter's life, her physical absence likely had a
devastating impact on Gwynne's development. 58 As the Fourth District
noted in In re MMJ., "[b]eing a parent involves more than attending a few
visits and sending an occasional gift to the child. The child needs a
positive, caring role model present in [his or her] life."15 9 This definition of
parental responsibilities is particularly applicable when the child has been
160
separated from her natural mother for the first three years of her life.
Accordingly, there was no relationship that could 16
have been preserved
1
formed.
ever
was
relationship
parent-child
no
because
Furthermore, although Detra's visitation and contact with Gwynne
were enough to establish she was a fit parent on a number of grounds,
incarceration prevented Detra from establishing any meaningful relationship with her daughter because she lacked daily physical presence in
Gwynne's life. 62 According to In re MMJ., unfitness based on repeated
incarceration is appropriate regardless of a parent's "efforts, compliance
with DCFS tasks and satisfactory attainment of goals, or the amount of
interest [the parent] has shown in [the child's] welfare."' 163 The holding of
In re MMJ. indicates that Detra's efforts to maintain a relationship with
her daughter are irrelevant to her ability to discharge parental responsibilities because she simply was not a parent to Gwynne while she sat in
prison.164 Although the court recognized Detra's changed lifestyle, it
ultimately agreed with the state, that the lasting effects 65of incarceration
prevented Detra from meeting her obligations to Gwynne. 1

158.
Supplemental Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T.
Murphy, et al. at 10-11, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
159.
In re M.M.J., 728 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
160.
Supplemental Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T.
Murphy, et al. at 9-10, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
161.
Id. at 10-11. "If Gwynne were older, and had already formed a bond with Detra
W., that bond could have been maintained while Detra was in prison." Id.
162.
See id. at 9 (suggesting that it was the "actual parental void" that Detra's
incarceration created, which was most detrimental to Gwynne).
163.
In re MMJ., 728 N.E.2d at 1240.
164.
See Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T. Murphy, et
al. at 18, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (I11.2005) (No. 98131) (suggesting that while
Detra was incarcerated during the early years of Gwynne's life she was not able to be a
parent because of the poor choices she made that lead to her incarceration).
165.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 521.
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RECOGNIZING THE DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF IN RE GWYNNE P.

It is important to remember that courts decide cases involving the termination of parental rights on a case-by-case basis. 166 In In re D.D., the
Illinois Supreme Court cautioned that "[u]nder different circumstances a
parent's repeated incarceration . . . may not prevent the parent from
discharging his or her parental duties and, therefore, would not establish
that parent's unfitness."' 167 Detra's resilient effort to establish and preserve
' 68
a relationship with her daughter satisfies these "different circumstances."'
If Detra Welch, who strived to meet every parental obligation she could
while incarcerated, does not satisfy such "different circumstances," it is
difficult to imagine how any previously incarcerated parent could ever
regain custody. 16 9 In order to respect the In re D.D. court's "cautionary
note," courts must focus on "the ability of the parent to carry out parental
responsibilities, and not on the indisputable fact that a parent has been
incarcerated."'' 70 As will be discussed in Part III.B., Detra's case is
distinguishable from previous cases involving section 1(D)(s) of the
Adoption Act, especially in regards to her successful rehabilitation. '7' The
court failed to recognize that Detra's efforts demonstrated "different
circumstances" and that her case should have been decided differently.
WHY TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED SOLELY ON
III.
INCARCERATION IS CONTRARY TO ILLINOIS'S GOAL OF REHABILITATION

Due to the rapidly increasing rates of mothers incarcerated for drug
offenses, terminating parental rights based solely on past incarceration is
likely to have a devastating impact on a number of minor children and the
preservation of families.' 72 Amici curiae on behalf of Detra Welch argued
that terminating parental rights based exclusively on repeated incarceration
undermines the state's interest in rehabilitating its citizens.'1 73 Amici curiae
set forth this compelling argument by analyzing how the First District's
holding in In re Gwynne P. discourages thousands of incarcerated mothers
who are trying to reform their lives in order to regain custody of their
Id. at 517.
166.
167.
In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d at 1121-22.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 347-48 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
168.
169.
Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 9, as Amici
curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (I11.2005) (No. 98131).
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 348 n.3 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
170.
171.
See infranote 187 and accompanying text.
172.
See supra Part I.A.
173.
Id.
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children. 174 Amici curiae based this argument on the Illinois Constitution
and Illinois state statutes that articulate the state's goal of rehabilitation. 175
This line of reasoning is crucial to the In re Gwynne P. decision because,
although the case only concerned the fate of Gwynne, the court's holding
76
will affect thousands of children with incarcerated parents. 1
A.

ILLINOIS'S GOAL OF REHABILITATION

The goal of rehabilitation is to reduce future crime by using the correctional system to reform offenders through psychiatric care, counseling, and
academic or vocational training. 177 The goal of rehabilitation is found in
article one, section eleven of the Illinois Constitution, which states, "[a]ll
penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the
offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."' 178 To satisfy this requirement, the First District held in People v.
Gibbs that a court should not only consider rehabilitation, it must make
rehabilitating the offender an objective of the sentence. 179 Furthermore, the
Gibbs court established that a defendant's individual circumstances and
history are important in evaluating the offender's potential for rehabilitation. 0
The state's goal of rehabilitation is also contained in the Illinois
Criminal Code, which states that one purpose of the code is to "[p]rescribe
penalties . . .which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation

possibilities among individual offenders."' 18 1 Additionally, the Probation
and Probation Officers Act describe how the state uses rehabilitation
programs to reform offenders. 182 Specifically, section (e) promotes
"[r]esidential alternative sentencing programs - those programs which
provide expanded sentencing options for less serious felony offenders and
18 3
delinquent juveniles, including mother and child unification programs."'
Overall, the Illinois Constitution and several statutes illustrate that one of
the state's objectives in sentencing is rehabilitating offenders into produc-

174.
Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 18, as
Amici curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (II. 2005) (No. 98131).
175.
Id. at 16.
176.
Id. at 18.
177.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15 (3d ed. Lexis Publishing
2001).
178.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
179.
People v. Gibbs, 364 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
180.
Id.
181.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-2(c) (2004).
182.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/16-2(a)-(e) (2004).
183.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/16-2(e) (2004).
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tive citizens. 184 When a mother like Detra Welch has taken affirmative
steps to meet the state's goal of becoming a "useful" citizen,' 8 5 terminating
her parental rights based 86
solely on past incarceration undermines the state's
1
rehabilitation.
in
interest
B.

WHY REHABILITATION IS RELEVANT TO PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

Amici curiae argued that the repeated incarceration provision of the
Adoption Act should not be interpreted in a way that ignores Illinois's
interest in rehabilitation. 187 The appellate court and Illinois Supreme
Court's analysis in In re Gwynne P. acknowledged Detra's successful
rehabilitation, even calling her efforts "deserving of recognition."' 188 In
fact, Detra's rehabilitation was relevant to the appellate court's decision to
reverse the trial court on three of the unfitness grounds. 189 Yet, when
analyzing whether Detra's repeated incarceration prevented her from
discharging parental responsibilities, the court disregarded her rehabilitation.' 90
Whether Detra's rehabilitation was relevant to her ability to discharge
parenting obligations entails balancing her past conduct against her
parenting capabilities at the time of the fitness hearing. The Illinois
Supreme Court case In re D.D. found that the legislature intended courts to
consider the "overall impact" repeated incarceration has on a parent's
responsibilities. 191 The court interpreted section 1(D)(s) broadly and found

184.
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-2(c) (2004); 730 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 1 10/16-2(a)-(e) (2004).
185.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
186.
Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 18, as
Amici curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
187.
Id.at 17.
188.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508, 520 (Ill.
2005).
189.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d 329, 338-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), aff'd, 830 N.E.2d
508 (Ill. 2005). On grounds that Detra failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern,
interest, or responsibility, the court relied on Detra's consistent performance in her service
plan and her completion of drug treatment to overturn the trial court's holding. Id. at 33537. On grounds that Detra failed to make reasonable progress or efforts, the court again
looked to her success in drug treatment to reverse the trial court. Id. at 338-40. Finally, on
the trial court's finding that Detra was unfit based on depravity, the appellate court reversed
because Detra had remained drug-free since 1999 and obtained employment at the
rehabilitation center. Id. at 341.
190.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 520 ("Detra's success in battling the addiction
she has suffered since the early 1990s is germane to a number of the grounds of unfitness...
•It is not pivotal, however, to the court's inquiry under section l(D)(s) of the Adoption
Act.").
191.
InreD.D.,752N.E.2d 1112, 1121 (111. 2001).
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that the incarceration does not need to occur during the child's lifetime. 91 2
The court found that the legislature's decision to use "repeated incarceration" in the singular form was significant because it indicates a broader,
more general concept. 193 Alternatively, the phrase "repeated incarcerations" suggests a specific reference to the incarcerations and focuses on the
parent's absence. 194 Analyzing the "overall impact" allows the court to
consider any circumstances resulting from a parent's imprisonment over a
period of time ranging from incarceration up until the termination hearing. 195
The court claimed it followed the "overall impact" standard established in In re D.D. by analyzing Detra's post-incarceration conduct, yet the
court did not justify why her rehabilitation was irrelevant to her ability to
discharge her parental responsibilities. 196 In determining what timeframe to
consider in In re Gwynne P., the state argued that the court should only
consider Detra's conduct leading up to the date of the petition.' 97 The state
maintained that Detra's conduct after her release from prison was irrelevant
during the unfitness stage because post-custody conduct should only be
considered during the second stage of the proceeding concerning the child's
best interests. 198 The court rejected the state's narrow timeframe and
concluded that the statute's language
denote[s] action beginning in the past and continuing to the
present .... We therefore believe that section 1(D)(s) must
be read as directing courts to consider how incarceration
has affected a person's ability to parent throughout the period beginning when the person went to jail and continuing
until the time the termination hearing is conducted. 199
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision to consider Detra's conduct
from the time she went to jail until the termination hearing seemed to
indicate the court would consider how her rehabilitation improved her
192.
Id. at 1120. The petitioner in In re D.D. argued that because he was incarcerated only once during his child's lifetime, the repeated incarceration provision did not apply
to him. Id. at 1119. The court disagreed and found section l(D)(s) applicable to the
petitioner because he had been imprisoned several times before the child was bom. Id. at
1121. Consequently, his past incarceration impacted his overall capabilities to discharge his
parental responsibilities. Id.
193.
Id. at 1120-21.
194. Id.
195.
See In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 518-19.
196. Id.at 519-20.
197. Id.at 518.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 518-19.
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ability to meet parental obligations. Moreover, the court noted, "the postincarceration period may provide useful insight into the effects repeated
incarceration has had on the parent's actual ability to function as a parent in
the outside world., 200 However, the court held that Detra's rehabilitation
was irrelevant to section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act because the critical
issue was the impact incarceration had on her ability, to discharge parental
responsibilities.2 0
By precluding consideration of Detra's rehabilitation during the unfitness hearing, the court overlooked the connection between Detra's
reformed life and her ability to meet parental responsibilities. When
evaluating section l(D)(s), the court looked almost exclusively at her
conduct prior to and during incarceration. 20 2 The court focused on the fact
that Detra was incarcerated during the first three years of Gwynne's life
and, therefore, did not acquire adequate parenting skills to provide for
Gwynne's special needs.20 3 Additionally, the court emphasized Detra's
unemployment during the years she was in and out of jail, her failure to
obtain a high school education while in prison, and her lack of financial
stability due to past incarceration. 20 4 In terms of Detra's capabilities since
her release from prison, the court questioned the reliability of Detra's
employment and her ability to provide financial support at the time of the
fitness hearing.20 5 Beyond the uncertainty of her financial status, the court
did not consider how Detra's reformed lifestyle could positively affect her
ability to care for Gwynne. Instead, the court made a general statement
deferring to the trial court's determination that "[Detra] would not have the
capability to serve as Gwynne's parent if given the opportunity to do so
now. ' 2°6 Failing to consider Detra's rehabilitation in relation to her
parenting abilities contradicts the "overall impact" standard from In re D.D.
because, by the time of the fitness hearing in 2003, Detra was a much
different person. 207

200.
ld. at 519.
201.
In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 520.
Id. at 520-21.
202.
203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 521.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at 520. Although the Illinois Supreme Court may have generalized the trial
court's findings, it should be noted that the trial court's findings are often given great
deference because that court has a better opportunity to evaluate the parties. In re Gwynne
P., 805 N.E.2d 329, 335 (I11.App. Ct. 2004), affid, 830 N.E.2d 508 (I11.2005).
207.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 347 (Garcia, J., dissenting) (noting that by May
2003, "Detra W. had been drug free for nearly four years; she was employed full time; she
worked as a 'detox specialist' helping others .. . ; she had her own apartment; and she was
entrusted with caring for her brother's three children.").
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Although several holdings on section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act
properly found a parent to be unfit, In re Gwynne P. is distinguishable
because Detra's rehabilitation and efforts to preserve a relationship with
Gwynne far exceeded parents' efforts in previous decisions. 20 8 For
example, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re D.D. involved a
father who was in prison nearly his entire adult life for violent crimes
including attempted murder and aggravated battery. 20 9 The court found he
lacked basic life skills, failed to demonstrate an ability to conform to
societal norms, never attempted to form a bond with his child, and did not
demonstrate any ability to meet his child's needs. 210 Thus, unlike In re
Gwynne P., the In re D.D. court demonstrated solid reasons why, at the
time of the hearing, the petitioner was an unfit parent.
An analysis of the same factors emphasized in In re D.D. reveals that
Detra's case presented different circumstances. Detra had not been
incarcerated her whole life, rather she had been in and out of prison from
1997 to 2003.21 Unlike the petitioner's violent criminal history in In re
D.D., Detra's convictions included drug offenses and retail theft. 21 2 Detra
23
had acquired life skills through counseling and parenting classes.
Furthermore, she demonstrated an ability to conform to societal norms by
obtaining employment as a drug counselor.2t 4 In addition, her efforts are
distinguishable from In re D.D. because she continually demonstrated an
interest and ability to meet Gwynne's needs through frequent contact and
visitations. 2 15 As discussed in Part I, the In re D.D. court suggested that
"[u]nder different circumstances" repeated incarceration would not
establish unfitness.216 Applying the facts from In re Gwynne P. to the
court's analysis in In re D.D., Detra Welch satisfied these "different
circumstances."

208.
See In re B.W. and D.W., 721 N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (I1. App. Ct. 1999) (finding
that the father had a long history of repeated incarceration and was not even aware of the
child's existence until the State initiated termination proceedings); In re Sheltanya S., 723
N.E.2d 744, 751 (111. App. Ct. 1999) (finding that while the father was incarcerated he never
inquired about his daughter, sent any gifts nor other evidence to demonstrate his ability to be
a parent).
209.
In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1121 (111. 2001).
210.
Id.
211.
See In re Gwynne P., 830N.E.2dat511-12.
212.
Id. at 511.
213.
Id. at 520.
214.
Id.at 516.
215.
Id.
216.
In re D.D., 752 N.E.2d at 1121-22.
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REHABILITATION CANNOT ERASE THE PAST

The state argued that the court should give Detra's conduct prior to
and during incarceration substantial weight because rehabilitation cannot
"erase the fact that due to her choice to become a fugitive from justice, she
put herself into a situation where she could not parent her infant child for
almost three years - the first three years of Gwynne's life. 217 The state
also contended that any interest in rehabilitation must be balanced against
the competing policy goal of establishing stability and permanency in
Gwynne's life.218 One goal of the Juvenile Court and Adoption Acts is to
secure permanency for children as quickly as possible. 219 Therefore, the
state maintained that although the state has an interest in rehabilitation, a
termination case ultimately concerns the child's best interests. 220 Notwithstanding Detra's successful rehabilitation, the termination proceeding was
not about the potentially harsh outcome on Detra; it was about seeking to
fill the void in Gwynne's life due to her mother's absence.221
D.

HOW CONCERN FOR THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS CAN BE RECONCILED
WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS

The competing policy goals of promoting rehabilitation and concern
for the child's best interests can be reconciled by considering separate
evidence at each stage of the termination proceeding. 222 Although the state
properly identified the importance of focusing on Gwynne's best interests,
the court cannot consider the best interests of the child during the first stage
of the termination proceeding. 223 Rather, the court must determine whether
the parent's conduct fits into one of the grounds for unfitness.2 24 The court
should consider a parent's rehabilitation a relevant factor during the
unfitness stage because it speaks to the parent's ability to discharge his or
her responsibilities. Therefore, the court should have considered Detra's
217.
Supplemental Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T.
Murphy, et al. at 15, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
218.
Id.
219.
Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T. Murphy, et al. at
33, In re Gwynne, 830 N.E.2d 508 (I11.
2005) (No. 98131); see also In re M.P, L.P, and C.P.
755 N.E.2d 1063, 1068 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (noting that one purpose of the Adoption Act is
to prevent children from living indefinitely in foster homes).
220.
Supplemental Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T.
Murphy, et al. at 15-16, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
221.
Id.
222.
See supra, notes, 77 and 79 (discussing the two stages of a parental rights
termination proceeding in Illinois).
223.
In re Adoption of Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174, 183 (Ill. 1990) (holding that "[w]hen
ruling on parental unfitness, a court is not to consider the child's 'best interests.' ").
224.
ld. at 184.
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rehabilitation because it was her competence and capability to be a parent at
the time of the hearing that was under scrutiny.225
While the first stage of a termination proceeding focuses on the parent's conduct, the second stage focuses on the child's best interests.226
During the second stage, the court can consider the need for permanency,
stability, and the importance of continuing relationships with parental
figures.22 7
Therefore, stability in Gwynne's life was an important
consideration, but only after the court first found Detra unfit based on clear
and convincing evidence. 28 Even if greater emphasis is placed on the
child's best interests, an additional goal of the Juvenile Court Act is "to
preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible., 229 In
Detra's case, preserving Gwynne's family ties was possible because of
Detra's reformed life. Arguably, had the court placed greater emphasis on
how Detra's rehabilitation positively impacted her ability to be a parent, the
court would not have found her unfit under section 1(D)(s). Consequently,
the case would never have reached the second stage to terminate her
parental rights.
IV. COMPARISONS ACROSS STATES

Illinois is not unique in its treatment of incarcerated parents involved
in termination proceedings. Yet, state laws vary on the process for
terminating parental rights of incarcerated parents. According to one
author, state treatment of termination of parental rights for incarcerated
parents can be broken down into four categories.23 ° In the first category,
states such as Colorado and Iowa terminate incarcerated parents' rights
based on the fact that the parent was in prison for a certain length of
time.23 ' Solely looking at the length of time is problematic because these
states may terminate parental rights based on the person's status without

225.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d 329, 345 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004), aff'd, 830 N.E.2d
508 (Ill. 2005) (Garcia, J., dissenting).
226.
Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 184.
227.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-3(4.05)(g) (2004).
228.
See Syck, 562 N.E.2d at 183.
229.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (2004).
230.
Steven Fleischer, Note, Termination of ParentalRights: An Additional Sentence
for IncarceratedParents,29 SETON HALL L. REv. 312, 325 (1998).
231.
ld; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 2004) (providing a
ground for termination of parental right if the parent has been incarcerated for at least six
years since the adjudication of dependency or neglect); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116 (West
2004) (proscribing that length of time required is more than five years if the child is already
in state care).
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considering the effect of incarceration on the parent-child relationship.2 32
Second, many states consider the nature of the crime and surrounding
circumstances as evidence of parental unfitness. 233 While this approach
allows an assessment of how the parent's specific acts impact his or her
ability to parent, the nature of the crime may not always indicate the
person's parenting abilities. 34 Other states look at the parent's incarceration status plus the parent's ability to provide a home for the child or the
parent's efforts to support and contact the child during the parent's
incarceration. 235 Illinois falls into this category because the statute requires
the parent's incarceration to impact his or her ability to discharge parental
responsibilities.236 Finally, states such as California and New Jersey
consider a variety of factors including the psychological effects and the
overall impact on the parent-child relationship.237 These states look beyond
the length of incarceration, nature of the crime, or the parent's contacts
when assessing parental unfitness. States using this approach "analyze the
parent-child relationship before and after incarceration, the effect of
parental incarceration on the child, the possibility of having a beneficial
relationship during the parent's incarceration, and the parent's ability to
fulfill his or her obligations., 238 This full-scale analysis provides the most
comprehensive assessment of a parent's ability and preserves the parent's
rights for Due Process.239
In a factually similar case to In re Gwynne P., a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision demonstrates the effect of a comprehensive analysis
and what can happen when courts look beyond a parent's status of
232.
Fleischer, supra note 230, at 327.
233.
Id. at 330; see, e.g., ARIz REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-533 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006)
(stating that termination is permitted if the parent is convicted of a felony that is "of such
nature as to prove the unfitness of such parent to have future custody and control of the
child"); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.106 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005) (allowing
termination for a "[c]onviction of the parent for commission of a felony, if the facts of the
crime are of such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to provide adequate care
and control to the extent necessary for the child's physical, mental or emotional health and
development").
234.
Fleischer, supranote 230, at 330-31.
235.
Fleischer, supra note 230, at 332; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
712A. 19b(3)(h) (West 2004) (permitting termination of parental rights if the parent has been
incarcerated for two years and has been unable to provide a stable home in the foreseeable
future); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447 (West 2004) (allowing termination based on "conviction
of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be
deprived of a stable home for a period of years; provided, however, that incarceration in and
of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights").
236.
750 ILL. COM2.STAT. 50/1(D)(s) (2004).
237.
Fleischer, supra note 230, at 334-35.
238.
Id. at 335.
239.
Id.
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incarceration. In Dep't of Human Serv. v. Jodie W (In re Max G. W.), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a trial court's termination of a mother's
parental rights, holding that "a parent's incarceration does not, in itself,
demonstrate that the individual is an unfit parent., 240 In 2002, Jodie was
incarcerated for "operating while intoxicated, fourth offense and for fleeing
an officer.", 24 1 She sent her two-year old son, Max, to live with her mother
while she was incarcerated. 242 However, shortly after Jodie received her
sentence, her mother contacted social services and informed them that she
could not care for her grandchild.243 Shortly thereafter, Max was placed
with a foster family. 244 During the dispositional hearing in December 2002,
the court explained several conditions that Jodie was required to meet in
order for Max to be returned to her home. Those conditions required Jodie
to:
(1) obtain, maintain and manage a suitable residence; (2)
cooperate with the Division of Children and Family Services; (3) maintain regular contact with Max, (4) actively
participate in services; (5) provide for the financial needs
of Max; (6) participate in a counseling program specifically
designed to address issues of domestic violence; and (7)
successfully complete any conditions of probation.245
In April 2004, the Kenosha County Department of Human Services
petitioned to terminate Jodie's parental rights.246 The County asserted that
Jodie had failed to meet the conditions for the safe return of Max, specifically noting that Jodie remained incarcerated and thus, had not secured a
suitable residence. 247 The petition also stated that there was a substantial
likelihood that Jodie would not meet the court-ordered conditions of return
within the next twelve months because she remained incarcerated.248
During the dispositional hearing, Jodie's attorney argued that it was
impossible for Jodie to have met the condition of return that she obtain a
suitable residence while she was incarcerated.249 However, the court
ultimately concluded that the state had established sufficient grounds and
240.

2006).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

In re Termination of Parental Rights to Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d 845, 860 (Wis.

Id. at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id 849-50.
In re Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 851.
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found Jodie an unfit parent under the Wisconsin statute. 250 The court
recognized the impossibility of Jodie being able to find suitable housing
while she was incarcerated, but attributed this impossibility to Jodie's own
actions. 251
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked to decide whether "a court
may find a parent unfit under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) based solely on the
parent's failure to meet an impossible condition of return." 252 In a 4-2
decision, the court ruled that conditions of return must be tailored to each
individual case and that while a court can consider a parent's incarceration,
the incarceration cannot be the decisive factor in determining parental
unfitness.2 53 The court stressed that other factors must also be considered,
including, "the nature of the crime committed by the parent, the length and
type of sentence imposed, the parent's level of cooperation with the
responsible agency . . . and the best interests of the child., 254 In applying
these other factors, the court found that Jodie had established a substantial
relationship with her son during the first two years of his life, she had made
considerable progress towards meeting many of the conditions of return,
and she had taken advantage of counseling opportunities while incarcerated.25 5 Overall, the court concluded that Jodie had "engaged in concerted
efforts to maintain contact with Max and clearly demonstrated that she
wanted to retain her parental rights. 256
Unlike In re Gwynne P., the Wisconsin Supreme Court's analysis provides a better understanding of how a parent's incarceration relates to the
decision to terminate parental rights. The Court gave considerable weight
to Jodie's "actual parenting activities" and focused on several factors
beyond her incarceration.257 While Detra's case is distinguishable because
the court did not impose a list of mandatory conditions, like Jodie, Detra
was faced with the impossibility of discharging her parental responsibilities
while she remained incarcerated. The Max G. W. decision recognizes the
need to assess the intangible aspects of an incarcerated parent's ability to

250.
Id. (applying WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2)(a)).
251.
InreMaxG.W.,716N.W.2dat851.
252.
Id. at 852.
253.
Id. at 860. The dissenters argued that the court did not terminate Jodie's
parental rights solely because of her status as an inmate. Id. at 864 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
Instead, the dissent focused on the overall statutory process that underlies unfitness hearings
and argued that the court had properly followed the statute. Id. The dissent also criticized
the majority for its reliance on a Nevada Supreme Court case because of the inherent
differences in the Wisconsin and Nevada statutes. Id. at 865.
254.
In re Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d at 860 (majority opinion).
255.
Id. at 860-61.
256.
Id. at 861.
257.
Id. at 860.
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maintain a relationship with her child and does not isolate past unfitness as
a dispositive of factor of unfitness.
CONCLUSION

The termination of parental rights involves drastic consequences for
parent and child. The destruction of families through incarceration has
become an increasing problem due to the rising rates of imprisoned mothers
for drug crimes.258 The Illinois Supreme Court's decision In re Gwynne P.
lacks guidelines for interpreting the repeated incarceration provision of the
Illinois Adoption Act, particularly in terms of what it means for an
incarcerated parent to discharge parental responsibilities. Inevitably, a
parent's incarceration generates a substantial void in a child's life because
the parent is not physically able to care for the child on a daily basis.
However, incarcerated parents can preserve intangible aspects of the
relationship with their child through visitation, phone calls, gifts, and
letters.259 It is a "legal fiction" to "ascribe" diminished capacity to
discharge her parental duties to Detra's failure to provide a stable home and
financial support for her daughter while she was incarcerated.260 Therefore,
to prevent repeated incarceration from becoming a per se grounds for
unfitness, the definition of parental responsibilities should include
emotional support and intangible qualities that can be fulfilled while a
parent is physically separated from his or her child.
Perhaps it was in Gwynne's best interest to terminate Detra Welch's
parental rights. After all, Gwynne's foster parents were the only family she
had ever known.261 Courts cannot make decisions on a child's best interest
based on a hope that the parent will not revert to a previous criminal
lifestyle.262 The court noted that if Detra remained dedicated to her
rehabilitation, her ability to discharge her parental obligations may change
in the future.263 Yet, the court did not indicate how much time must pass or
what else Detra must do to prove that she is a fit mother.
If a mother like Detra Welch, who overcame drug addiction and reformed her life, is unfit, then it is likely the vast majority of mothers
currently incarcerated will also lose their parental rights. 264 Detra's
rehabilitation demonstrated that she was a fit parent by the time of the
258.
See supra Part I.A.
259.
See Genty supranote 70, at 767.
260.
In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 348. (Garcia, J., dissenting).
261.
Supplemental Brief and Argument of Minor-Respondent-Appellee, Patrick T.
Murphy, et. al. at 18, In re Gwynne, 830 N.E.2d 508 (111. 2005) (No. 98131).
262.
See In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d at 521.
263.
Id.
264.
See supra Part I.A.
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termination hearing. 265 Based on the Illinois Constitution, Detra had
"become the useful citizen the framers had hoped for." 266 She had done all
she could to reunite her family but inevitably could not change the one
factor over which she no longer had control - her past incarceration.2 67
Due to the fundamental liberty interest in raising a child, this alone cannot
be enough to terminate parental rights. Detra's power to overcome
obstacles "serves[s] as a model for the efforts required to regain fitness as a
parent. ' 268 Thus, Detra Welch satisfied the Illinois Constitution's goal of
becoming a productive citizen, only to find her perseverance was irrelevant
to preserve her parental rights.
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265.
See In re Gwynne P., 805 N.E.2d at 349 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
266.
Brief of Chicago Legal Advocacy for Incarcerated Mothers, et al. at 17, as
Amici curiae, In re Gwynne P., 830 N.E.2d 508 (Ill. 2005) (No. 98131).
267.
Id.
268.
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